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Abstract:  Trade does not stimulate growth in economies with excessive regulation.  We examine 
the effect of openness on growth using cross-country regressions on data from more than 100 
countries.  Results from levels regressions imply that increased openness is, if anything, 
associated with a lower standard of living in heavily-regulated economies.  Growth regressions 
confirm that the effect of increased trade on growth is absent in highly regulated countries.  Once 
we control for the effect of domestic regulation, the evidence that trade positively affects growth 
is stronger than has been found in previous studies.  Excessive regulations restrict growth 
because resources are prevented from moving into the most productive sectors and to the most 
efficient firms within sectors.  In addition, in highly regulated economies, increased trade is more 
likely to occur in the wrong goods—i.e. goods where comparative advantage does not lie.  The 
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I.  Introduction 
 
There is some evidence that trade leads to faster income growth.  The intuition is that 
openness enhances specialization, raising the level of income.  Specialization also improves the 
return on investment, which stimulates growth.  In addition, there is increasing evidence that 
trade fosters productivity growth within industries, forcing bad firms to exit and allowing good 
firms to expand.  But trade cannot induce specialization or discipline firms if factor movement is 
restricted.  In many economies, strict regulations prevent some firms from entering, others from 
exiting, and labor from moving across sectors or across firms.  In these countries, trade may be 
less able to serve as a force of growth.  The logic is simple: if the structure of economic activity 
is rigid, then trade only has a modest impact on the allocation of resources across and within 
industries.  Moreover, to the extent that production structure does change, excessive regulation 
may encourage increased production of the wrong goods—goods the country is not relatively 
efficient at producing.   
Alternatively, it is possible that trade forces countries to ease regulations.  Trade will 
increase the costs of excessive regulation and could lead domestic and foreign investors to 
pressure the government to improve institutions.  Indeed, there is some evidence that increased 
trade reduces corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999).  Trade could therefore have a stronger effect 
on growth in countries with bad institutions since it could both encourage regulatory reform and 
lead to more specialization.   
In this paper, we examine whether the effect of trade on growth is dependent on the  
regulatory environment.  We find strong evidence that increased trade does not stimulate growth 
in economies with high regulation, and some evidence that trade may even hamper growth in 
those with excessive regulation.  Our results imply that any beneficial effect of trade on   3
institutions does not compensate for the damage that a poor regulatory structure does to 
generating growth through trade.  The implication for policy sequencing is that the countries that 
place an excessive regulatory burden on the private sector must have a strategy in place to 
improve their business climate before (or at least contemporaneously with) undertaking trade 
reform. 
  Our work contributes to a growing literature on the importance of trade and institutions in 
growth.  Variables representing both institutions and openness have been shown to be highly 
significant in cross-country growth regressions, and there is evidence that causality runs from 
institutional quality and trade to growth.  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) show that 
institutions instrumented by settler mortality rates have large effects on income levels.  Frankel 
and Romer (1999) show that openness instrumented by distance has significant effects on 
growth. 
There is an ongoing debate about which of the two—institutions or openness—is more 
important for growth.  Using different methodologies, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) 
and Dollar and Kraay (2002) run a horse race between institutions and trade.  Results from the 
former suggest that institutions matter more for growth in the very long run, while results from 
the latter imply that trade is more important for medium-term growth.  Dollar and Kraay (2003), 
however, argue that independent effects of trade and institutions are impossible to identify in the 
long run because their underlying determinants are the same.   
We focus on the interaction between the two, as opposed to evaluating the direct 
contributions of trade and institutions to growth.  We find that trade is not good for growth in 
highly regulated countries, as measured by regulation on entry and labor.  Our results imply that   4
there is a primacy of institutions over trade in the most distorted economies—not only do bad 
institutions lower growth, but they also prevent trade from generating growth. 
    The paper is organized as follows.  The next section surveys evidence on trade and 
growth and how regulations affect structural change following liberalization.  Section III 
describes the data.  Section IV and V present the cross-section levels and growth results, 
respectively.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  The Evidence on Trade, Growth, and Structural Change  
There is a large literature on the effect of openness on growth.  The general conclusion is 
that impediments to trade lower growth (Dollar 1992, Ben-David 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995, 
and Frankel and Romer 1999).  Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), however, argue that the measures 
of openness used are poor measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources 
of bad performance.  For example, they show that the results on openness and growth are not 
robust when controlling for other determinants of income.  But, since the number of observations 
is limited, the Rodriguez-Rodrik (1999) results also have a shortcoming; there are too many 
highly-correlated explanatory variables in their regression, making it impossible to identify the 
separate effect of trade on growth. 
There are alternative ways of looking for evidence that trade promotes growth.  Since the 
gains are theorized to come through specialization, we would hope to see evidence that sectoral 
output and employment are influenced by the level of openness.  While there is evidence that 
comparative advantage guides specialization, the evidence that the degree of specialization is 
influenced by openness is weak.  Using data on production patterns in 20 OECD countries since 
1970, Redding (2002) finds that world prices have been a major driver of specialization, but that   5
specialization does not tend to increase over time.  Wacziarg and Wallack (2003) find little 
evidence that labor turnover increases following trade liberalization, using data from 25 episodes 
of trade liberalization.  The countries in their sample, however, tend to be ones with excessive 
regulations, such as Argentina and Bolivia, and they do find increases when reform is broader 
and includes deregulation and privatization.  Other related work also offers only modest evidence 
of significant labor reallocation as openness increases in developing countries (see, for example, 
Papageorgiou et. al. 1991, Revenga 1997, Currie and Harrison 1997, Roberts and Tybout 1996).  
The fact that trade reform does not affect employment in developing countries is often attributed 
to excessive labor regulations.  Indeed, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) show that employment 
protection has strong negative effects on the reallocation of labor.  This suggests that trade will 
have a lower effect on growth in economies with rigid labor laws. 
The micro evidence that trade promotes an intra-sectoral reallocation of resources is 
stronger.  Firm heterogeneity and a wide dispersion of productivity levels are well documented 
within industries; as a result, exit is necessary to rid the sector of low productivity firms and 
entry is important to enable the arrival of new industry leaders.  Roberts and Tybout (1996) find 
that about 80 percent of employment reallocation in a handful of semi-industrialized countries 
occurs within rather than across four-digit ISIC industries. They also find that productivity 
dispersion tends to be relatively greater in industries not exposed to foreign competition, and that 
productivity growth is higher in tradable products.  This implies that foreign competition serves 
as a disciplining device within industries.  Bernard and Jensen (1999) use plant level data from 
the United States and show that the effect of reallocation on productivity is quite large, making 
up over 40% of total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.  They also find that 
reallocation to exporting firms is important in generating growth effects.  Pavcnik (2002) finds   6
that a reshuffling of resources and output to the more efficient producers was largely responsible 
for aggregate productivity growth in Chile following trade liberalization.  She concludes that 
“barriers to plant turnover are important determinants of the success of trade liberalization.”  In a 
survey of studies of transition economies, Djankov and Murrell (2003) find that productivity is 
enhanced by import competition in Eastern European countries, but is in general reduced by 
import competition in the former Soviet Union—where business regulations tend to be more 
burdensome.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis that trade promotes growth only in 
the presence of benign regulation on factor movements. 
  In sum, these results imply that cross-country studies of trade and growth will suffer a 
bias since they do not control for the regulatory regime.  This paper provides a remedy by 
allowing the elasticity of trade to growth to be different in highly regulated economies.  Most 
importantly, this allows us to determine whether the regulatory environment matters for trade to 
have positive effects on growth. 
 
III.  Data 
The dependent variable is income. We use the level and average growth of real per capita 
income at PPP.  For the levels regressions, per capita income is measured as the log-level of per 
capita GDP at constant 1996 dollars in PPP terms for the year 2000, from the Summers-Heston 
dataset version 6.1.  For the growth regressions we use average growth in real income during the 
1990s, from the same dataset.  It is standard practice to use PPP-adjusted GDP because it more 
accurately captures the standard of living across different countries, and is not subject to large re-
orderings in rank as a result of exchange rate fluctuations.    7
Our index of regulations is composed of data on labor regulations and business entry 
regulations drawn from the “Doing Business” dataset of the World Bank.  Data are available for 
a list of 133 countries benchmarked at January 2003.  While some business and labor regulations 
may be necessary to protect consumers and workers, evidence implies that too much regulation 
is inefficient and harms the very groups it claims to protect.  Djankov et al. (2002) find that 
countries with more restrictive entry procedures have higher corruption and larger unofficial 
economies, but not better quality public or private goods.  Botero et. al. (2003) show that 
countries with more restrictive labor laws have a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force 
participation, and higher unemployment, especially of women and young adults. 
These measures of entry and labor regulations also have been shown to have large effects 
on industrial structure and adjustment.  Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) find that in countries 
with excessive regulations, industries respond to shocks to growth opportunities through the 
expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low barriers to entry, industries respond 
through the creation of new firms.  Moreover, in countries with high entry barriers, industries 
characterized by large turnover tend to have only a few large firms while countries with low 
barriers have many smaller firms.  Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2003) use data on firms in 
Western and Eastern Europe and find that entry regulations lead to less entry, especially in 
industries with naturally high entry.  They also find less entry into labor-intensive industries in 
countries with excessive labor regulations.   
The labor regulations index consists of the logarithm of an employment laws index, 
where the latter reflects how regulated the labor market is and is constructed through an 
examination of detailed provisions in the labor laws of each country. The employment laws 
index is an average of three indices covering flexibility of hiring, conditions of employment and   8
flexibility of firing.
1  The natural logarithm of the index of labor regulations ranges in value from 
3.66 to 4.09 in the sample of 108 countries that we use.  Next we develop an index of entry 
regulations, using data on the number of procedures and the time it takes to start a business in 
each country.  We take the logarithm of an equally-weighted average of the data from both sets 
of entry regulations (number of procedures and days) after rescaling each dataset series.  The 
final range of values for the natural log of the constructed entry regulation index is 3.71 to 4.12.  
We then average the index of labor regulations and the index of entry regulations, with final 
values of the regulation index ranging from 3.71 to 4.09.  The index of regulations is constructed 
such that higher values reflect a greater degree of regulation both in the labor market and the 
business sector.   
Appendix Table A4 shows the mean of the regulation index for various income groups 
and regions.  While high income countries do tend to have less regulation, the index is not 
monotonically increasing in income.  Low- and middle-income countries tend to have roughly 
the same level of regulation on average. Regional differences are more acute.  Latin America and 
the Caribbean is the most regulated region, North America is the least regulated region.  United 
States, Denmark, New Zealand, Canada, and Hong Kong are the five least regulated countries.  
Brazil, Belarus, Mozmbique, Venezuela, and Paraguay are the five most regulated. 
We use two measures of trade openness.  The first is a measure of current total trade 
relative to current GDP in local currency.  The second is a PPP-adjusted measure that uses 2000 
trade data (exports and imports at current dollars) from the WDI and is then deflated to be 
                                                 
1 The raw data we have from the Doing Business database for the labor and entry components are rescaled such that 
their mean values are 50 and standard deviation 5. The final series range in value from 39 to 60 for the employment 
laws  index, from 38.36 to 62.34 for the number of entry procedures and 43.26 to 69.20 for the number of days it 
takes to start a new business over the sample of 108 countries used in our regression analysis.   9
expressed in terms of 1996 dollars.
2  We then divide it by 2000 GDP at PPP at constant 1996 
dollars.
3 The log of these ratios are then used as our measures for trade openness.  
We use a rule-of-law index that is constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(2002) for the period 2000-01 and taken from the Dollar and Kraay dataset.  The index is 
constructed for 175 countries. It is constructed from indicators reflecting “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the 
incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), 
page 8).   
We add as explanatory variables in the regression the natural logarithm of population as a 
proxy for market size, with data taken from the WDI.  In addition we have a dummy variable for 
countries that are land-locked and a variable on the distance of these countries from the equator, 
measured as absolute value of latitude of the country’s capital city.   Both are taken from the 
Dollar and Kraay dataset (2002). We also use data on the legal origin of countries as well as data 
on their proportions of English and European-languages speakers, drawn from Doing Business 
dataset and Dollar and Kraay, respectively.  We start with the Doing Business dataset of 133 
countries and delete those countries for which data are not available for our explanatory 
variables.
4  This leaves us with a maximum of 108 countries in the levels regressions, listed in 
the Appendix (Table A1).   
                                                 
2 We deflate the data using the US GDP deflator for years 1996 and 2000. Dollar and Kraay in their dataset 
construct their log trade openness measure in a different way. They deflate the trade data at constant 1995 $ by 
1.4636 (the cumulative growth of US GDP deflator for the period 1985-1995). They then divide it by real GDP at 
PPP at constant 1985 dollars and take the natural logarithm of that ratio. 
3 This is constructed by adding our figures for the log-real per capita GDP at PPP at constant 1996 dollars for year 
2000 from the Summers-Heston dataset with the logarithm of population at 2000 from WDI. 
4 We had to delete countries for which there were no data on entry and labor regulations indices, current trade to 
GDP or PPP per capita real income from the Summers-Heston dataset among others.   10
We construct a dummy variable for the log-level of the regulation index that takes a value 
of 1 for the one-quarter and subsequently one-third most heavily regulated countries and zero 
otherwise.  
  
IV. Cross-Section Analysis 
  Our goal is to examine the effect of trade on growth.  First, we use cross-section levels 
regressions, which are meant to capture the effect of openness on long-run growth.  Second, we 
examine the effect of trade growth on income growth using decadal regressions, which will 
reflect medium-term changes.  We instrument for trade, regulations, and institutions to adjust for 
the possibility that higher growth leads to institutional reform and more trade. 
In the cross-sectional analysis, the dependent variable is the log–level of real per capita 
income. Under the assumption that in a distant past, incomes across countries were fairly similar, 
current levels of per capita income should reflect the varying growth performance of countries in 
the very long run.  Figure 1a shows a scatter plot of trade openness and per-capita income in the 
three quarters of countries with the least regulations.  The simple correlation between openness 
and income is positive and significant.  Figures 1b plots the same figure for the one-quarter most 
regulated countries, respectively.  There are fewer observations when we restrict the sample so it 
is not surprising that the coefficient on openness is not significant in Figure 1b.  But the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are of interest; in the most regulated economies there is no 
evidence that trade has a positive effect on growth.   Figure 2 repeats the exercise using 
trade/GDP at PPP as the measure of openness.  Again the evidence that openness affects growth 
is much less convincing among the most regulated economies.     11
The figures suggest that the link between growth and openness is weaker or absent in the 
most regulated economies, but we have not controlled for the standard determinants of income.  
We do so by estimating the following equation: 
 
(1)  Per-capita Incomei = β0 + β1(TradeOpenness)i + β2(TradeOpenness*Regulation 
Dummy)i + β3 (Index of Regulations)i + β4(Regulation Dummy)I  +  β5(Population)i  +   
β5(Landlocked)i  +  β5(Distance to Equator)i.   
  
where per capita income, trade, population and the regulation index enter in logs.  The null 
hypothesis to be tested is that the effect of openness on growth is the same regardless of the 
degree of regulation.  Thus, if the null is rejected then the coefficient on the interactive term 
between openness and the regulation index dummy (β2) will be significantly different from zero. 
The Regulation dummy is a variable that is one if the country is among the most 
regulated economies.  We define most regulated as the economies that rank in the top quarter of 
the sample according to our index.
5  We use a regulation dummy as opposed to the regulation 
index directly in the interaction because it offers the best fit and the interpretation is more 
straightforward.  We also tried interacting the index directly with trade (after rescaling it to be 
increasing in simplicity).  The signs are as expected but the significance is somewhat lower. 
Moreover, when both interactive terms (with the dummy and with the regulation index) are 
included in the regression equation, only the interactive with the dummy is significant, implying 
that there is a threshold after which the regulatory environment becomes less conducive to 
                                                 
5 We also tried using one-fifth and one-third as cutoffs, the results were broadly similar, though tended to be 
somewhat stronger when the one-quarter cutoff was used.  Loosening the threshold gives more degrees of freedom, 
but it also makes the sample more diverse in terms of regulations.  We also tried using two cutoffs for bottom 
quarter and top quarter, but only the interactive with the bottom quarter is significant   12
growth.  In addition, we allowed for a quadratic effect, but again the dummy interactive 
performed best.     
In line with some previous evidence, we expect that an increase in trade openness will 
promote growth.  A better regulatory regime would increase growth through its effect on 
investment, productivity and new entry.
6  Many papers rely on indicators of rule of law that are 
based on survey data.  A problem with such perception-based indices is that they are likely to be 
tainted by stage of development.
7  Still, as a robustness check we include the Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) index in some of our regressions.  Countries with a larger population 
and a larger market size are expected to grow faster because of scale economies. Countries that 
are land-locked and closer to the equator are expected to grow slower.   
We first estimate Equation 1 with the log-level of real per capita income at PPP in 2000, 
in constant 1996 dollars (taken from the Summers-Heston dataset) as the dependent variable and 
openness measured using nominal trade/nominal GDP.  Results are reported in Table 1.  Column 
1 reports the results including the regulation index but not the interactive term.  All of the 
variables have the expected signs.   We find that trade openness raises growth, but the coefficient 
is not significant.  The results are similar to Rodrik et. al. (2002), who use rule of law in place of 
our index of regulations and also find no significant effect of openness on growth in cross-
section regressions.  The negative and significant coefficient on the regulation index implies that 
less regulated countries grow faster.
8  Population has no significant effect on growth.
9   Countries 
                                                 
6 Using detailed panel data on entry regulations in Europe and the United Status, Alesina et al. (2002) find that entry 
regulation greatly reduces investment and is more important than privatization in doing so. 
7 See World Bank 2003 for an in depth discussion of the disadvantages of using perceptions based indicators. 
8 The reader is reminded that higher values on that index reflect more regulation. 
9 Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2003) discuss the costs and benefits of size.  While there are several positive 
effects of size, heterogeneity has negative effects on growth and is likely to be larger in bigger countries.  Thus, it is 
not clear a larger size should be associated with higher income.     13
further away from the equator grow significantly faster.  Being landlocked hurts growth 
significantly.   
The coefficient of interest is on openness in the most regulated economies.   As shown in 
columns 2, the coefficient is negative, highly significant, and more than three times as large as 
the coefficient on openness.  This suggests that openness hinders growth in the most regulated 
countries.  In addition, controlling for the detrimental effect of regulations on trade and growth, 
we find that the positive effect of trade on growth is more apparent.  The coefficient on openness 
increases from .08 to .43 and is now significant at the 5 percent level.  Summing the coefficient 
on openness and openness in the most regulated economies, implies that a 1 percent increase in 
openness in these highly regulated economies leads to about a 0.9 percent decrease  (-
1.33+0.43=-0.90) in income per capita.   
In Column 3, we include rule of law as an additional variable and the coefficient on our 
regulation index goes down.  This is expected as the rule of law index also reflects the 
institutional environment of countries.  Countries with better–functioning institutions are less 
likely to be hampered with inefficient laws and regulations. Figure 5 confirms the very strong 
positive correlation between less regulation and stronger rule of law in our sample. When rule of 
law is included, the trade-regulation interactive term remains negative and highly significant.  
In order to test whether our results are driven by a specific region, we include 7 regional 
dummies in the regression.
10  The coefficient on the interactive term declines somewhat, but 
remains negative and highly significant.  Even accounting for regional variation in growth, the 
effect of trade on highly regulated economies appears to be negative.  The coefficient on 
                                                 
10 Dummies are for East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern and Central Europe, Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia, West Europe, North America (excluded), Sub Saharan Africa, and Latin America.   14
openness declines markedly and is no longer significant, suggesting that to the extent that trade 
stimulated growth, its effects were highly regionalized.   
Alcala and Ciccone (2002) argue that trade relative to GDP at PPP, which they call “real 
openness”, is a better measure of openness than (nominal) trade to (nominal) GDP, while Rodrik 
and Rodriguez (2001) maintain that the reverse is true.  The motivation for using real openness is 
that if trade raises productivity in the tradables sector, the price of non-tradables will rise and this 
can depress the measure of openness despite increased trade.  However, as Rodrik and Rodriguez 
show, real openness may suffer a more extreme bias.  If the tradable sector experiences a 
productivity gain for any non-trade reason, measured openness will increase, even if there is no 
increase in trade.  Using real openness hence biases us toward accepting the relationship between 
openness and trade, even when one is absent. 
Next, we use trade as a percent of GDP (adjusted for PPP) as the explanatory variable.  
The results are reported in Table 2.  The results on trade are the same in sign though in this case 
as expected the evidence that openness promotes growth is much more robust.  Even in the 
baseline regression model trade/GDP at PPP is significant (Column 1). 
Column 2 reports the results with the interactive term.  The interactive term remains 
negative and highly significant.  Moreover, the coefficient is larger in magnitude than the 
coefficient on trade, implying that growth effects of trade are absent in highly regulated 
economies. 
Columns 3 and 4 add the rule of law index and regional dummies, respectively.  The 
coefficient on the interactive term remains negative and highly significant.   However, as in the 
case of nominal openness, when regional variation is allowed for the growth effects of trade 
disappear.   15
 
Dealing with Endogeneity 
Next, we address the endogeneity problems in the OLS regressions. First, it is likely that 
countries that grow faster engage in more trade than others. Faster economic growth may lead to 
technological and production developments that expand export markets while domestic demand 
for imports may grow with rising incomes.  This will lead us to over-estimate the effect of both 
trade and the interactive term on growth (in the sense that the coefficient on the trade-regulation 
interactive term is expected to be negative but its absolute magnitude is likely to be biased 
downward).  There may also be omitted variables that are correlated both with per capita 
incomes and trade that will bias the coefficients on trade such as for instance factors like 
infrastructure or governance.  Following Frankel and Romer (1999), we use the fitted values of 
trade predicted by the exogenous variables in a gravity model as an instrument for trade.
11  
Second, we instrument for the regulation index.  Countries with rising or high incomes 
are more likely to face better regulatory environments. As countries grow faster, the costs of a 
heavy regulatory burden in the face of expanding markets and business opportunities becomes 
higher, thereby accelerating regulatory reform. The government may face greater pressures from 
the private sector to remove administrative constraints. We instrument for the regulation index 
with the share of population speaking English or a major European language as well as legal 
origin of countries.  The premise is that colonial origin may have influenced the current 
regulatory state of countries by influencing their earlier institutional heritage. Legal origin may 
                                                 
11 We use Frankel and Rommer’s approach to get fitted bilateral trade shares (sum of imports and exports to GDP) 
for countries using 2000 bilateral trade data and we then aggregate the bilateral trade shares for each country i across 
its trade partners j. We use as instruments for bilateral trade shares geographical variables such as a dummy for 
landlocked countries, distance from equator, and other variables such as a dummy for a common border, language 
variables, population and cross-terms. See Frankel and Rommer (1999). In the case where we use trade/GDP at PPP 
(all in 1996 dollars) as the measure of openness, we also use as bilateral trade data sum of exports and imports to 
GDP at PPP (all in 1996 dollars).   16
also determine the disposition of countries to reform their institutional structures as well as the 
pace of reforms.  We do not use the measures of settler mortality as proposed by Acemoglu et al 
(2001) as this cuts our sample by more than a half.   
Third, faster growth may also bring about improvements in the institutional environment. 
For instance, as countries grow faster, the level of education may improve and there may be a 
greater receptiveness for institutional improvements and reforms. In addition, the rule of law 
index is constructed from opinion surveys and other subjective measures. The responses of the 
experts engaged in the surveys may be biased by the current state of the economy.  Also there are 
likely to be omitted variables correlated with both per capita real incomes and institutional 
quality in our regression such as political regime characteristics.  We instrument here the rule of 
law index with the same variables as the regulation index. 
Table 3 reports the results for openness.  The first column repeats the corresponding OLS 
results (column 2, Table 1) for reference.  First, we instrument only for the interactive term using 
predicted trade, the language variables, and legal origin as instruments.  The coefficient on the 
interactive term increases (as does the coefficient on openness and the dummy) and remains 
negative and highly significant.   
Column 3 reports the results using the same set of instruments, but instrumenting for 
openness, the regulation dummy, and the regulation index, as well as the interactive term. With 
the exception of openness, which is no longer significant, the sign and significance of all of the 
endogenous variables remains unchanged.   
Column 4 reports the results using two stage instrumental variables.  In the first stage, we 
regress the dummy and the interactive term on a selection of the excluded exogenous variables   17
using logit and tobit respectively.
12  The predicted values are used as instruments in the 
regression.  Again, all of the instrumented variables except openness remain significant.  In this 
case, there is less of a jump in the coefficient on the interactive term. 
Using the same instruments, and instrumenting for rule of law as well as the other 
endogeneous variables leads to insignificant results for all the endogeneous variables.  There are 
too many highly correlated endogenous variables to be identified by the same set of instruments.  
While all signs remain robust, none of the endogenous variables are significant (not reported). In 
the final column, the results are reported including rule of law, but assuming the regulation 
dummy variable is exogenous.
13   Column 5 reports results of the same regression, excluding rule 
of law for comparison purposes.   When rule of law is included, the regulation index is not 
significant.  The trade interactive term remains highly significant.  
While the IV results are supportive of the notion that trade does not support growth in 
highly regulated countries, it is very difficult to find good instruments that uniquely identify the 
endogenous variables.  The lower half of Table 3 reports the Shea partial R
2 and the P-value of 
the Hansen J-statistic for each regression.  The Shea R
2 takes into account the collinearity 
between the endogenous variables and also the extent to which the same instruments are being 
relied upon for identification.  The Shea R
2 is low for trade, indicating that part of the reason we 
may not get significant results for trade is that it is not well identified.  Still, the highly 
significant results for the interactive term imply that any positive effect of trade on poorly 
regulated countries is highly suspect.  The Hansen J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
                                                 
12 We use only a selection of the exogenous variables because it could not converge when all variables were 
included. 
13 In this case, in order to help identify the interactive term, we also add two instruments, an interaction between 
landlock and the dummy and between fraction of the population speaking European languages and the dummy.   18
instruments are valid in an IV regression with robust standard errors.  In all cases, we cannot 
reject that the instruments are valid.   
Table 4 reports the results, using the same instruments as above except using real 
openness as the endogenous variable.  In this case, there are two reasons why the coefficient on 
trade and the interactive term is likely to be biased upwards.  First, countries that grow faster will 
have higher trade growth.  Second, since trade is measured as a fraction of GDP at PPP, there are 
additional problems due to price effects.  Columns 2-6 report the instrumented results. When we 
control for endogenous effects, the coefficient on trade increases in almost all cases and the 
coefficient on the interactive term remains negative and is larger in magnitude.  The coefficient 
on the interactive term is always larger than the coefficient on openness, suggesting that trade 
does not enhance growth in highly-regulated economies.  However, the coefficient on trade is no 
longer robustly significant.  In part, this is due to poor identification.  The Shea partial R
2 is quite 
low, especially in the last t column when rule of law is included.  When we include rule of law, 
the interactive term remains highly significant and its magnitude is similar to OLS.   
 
V. Trade, Regulations and Growth in Recent Years 
  The levels regressions provide evidence that long-run growth is not helped, and may even 
be hampered, by trade in highly regulated economies.  However, it is possible that heavily 
regulated economies become more dependent on trade in the long run because of their inflexible 
domestic business environment, but that a higher level of trade in these economies is still 
associated with growth, or at least does not lead to an income loss.  In this section, we examine 
changes in openness and income in the 1990s to see if the results are robust in the short/medium 
run.     19
We carry out the data analysis using decadal growth rates.   We estimate the following 
equation, which is essentially a lagged difference version of the levels regression equation (1) 
and includes initial income to control for convergence effects: 
(3)   y ct-yc,t-k = α1.( yc,t-k) + α2
T. (Xct – Xc,t-k),   
where Xc is a set of control variables from equation 1 (t=time period ;  k= number of lags).  
Equation (3) amounts to regressing growth on initial income and changes in the set of 
explanatory variables. 
Ideally, we would like to estimate the growth regressions over three decades, as in Dollar 
and Kraay (2002).  However, to do this we would need the one-quarter (or one-third) most 
regulated economies in each period, which is not available.  As a result, we use only average 
growth the 1990s and continue to use the regulation data from Doing Business.  This approach is 
valid, assuming that regulations are slow to change and have been roughly constant since 1990.  
We add the regulation index, a dummy variable for the most heavily regulated countries, and an 
interactive term between trade and the regulation dummy.  Upon differencing over time, given 
the assumption of slow changes in regulations over time and a time invariant dummy variable, 
we end up with only the interactive term between the change in trade over time and the dummy 
variable as an additional explanatory variable to the decadal growth regressions.
14   
We extend the decadal panel dataset of Dollar and Kraay (2002), omitting the countries 
for which no data are available on regulations, legal origin and institutional measures, and 
considering only the 1990s.  We end up with a maximum of 98 observations over the 1990s. The 
list of countries is provided in the Appendix, Table A2. 
                                                 
14 To the extent that the worst regulated countries are slow to grow, as a robustness check, we tried including the 
regulation dummy in the regression, it was very close to zero and never significant (not reported).     20
  First, we use the data on regulations and focus on the change in the last period.  We 
regress the decadal average per capita GDP growth in the 1990s (measured at PPP in constant 
1985 dollars)
15 on the initial value of log real GDP per capita at PPP (at constant 1985 dollars) at 
the beginning of the decade, the change over the previous decade in the log of average trade to 
GDP (or the log of average trade to GDP at PPP)
16, the change in the average inflation rate, the 
change in the investment ratio, and the interactive term between the change in trade and the 
regulation dummy variable.
17  In this section, because the sample is smaller and to keep the 
cutoff point similar to that from the cross-section regression, we report results for the one-third 
most regulated countries; the results are similar if we the one-quarter most regulated countries, 
though standard errors are slightly larger.  We also try including a measure of the change in 
institutional environment.  We use the average rule of law index from ICRG
18 as an institutional 
measure. This measure reflects upon the security of property rights, risks of political instability 
and the stability of laws respectively.  We also use the change in the number of revolutions and 
change in the fraction of the population killed in civil or international wars as alternative 
measures of institutional quality.
19 
In Table 5, estimation results are reported for the 1990s decadal regressions, using 
growth in trade/GDP as an independent variable.  Columns 1-6 report results using OLS with a 
correction for heteroskedasticity.  An increase in trade significantly raises growth. However, in 
                                                 
15 The data here are not from the Summers-Heston dataset but taken from the Dollar and Kraay dataset. Dollar and 
Kraay use data on real per capita GDP at PPP at constant 1985 dollars from the Summers and Heston Penn World 
Tables Version 5.6, after extending it to the 1990s using constant price local currency growth rates. 
16 Trade/GDP is constructed by deflating the sum of exports and imports at constant 1995 dollars by the cumulative 
growth of US GDP deflator from 1985-1995 and dividing by GDP at PPP in constant 1985 dollars. 
17 We also include change in government spending to GDP and change in the black market premium as additional 
measures of macro stability, but neither was ever significant, they tended to be close to zero and changed sign 
depending on specification, so we do not include them in the reported regressions. 
18 This is the Law and Order rating from ICRG and is different from the rule of law index of Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
19 The investment ratio is investment/GDP both at constant 1985$, at PPP; the inflation measure is  
ln (1+inflation/100),  inflation rate measured as annual percent change in CPI if available, otherwise annual percent 
change in GDP deflator. All data in the decadal analysis are from the Dollar and Kraay dataset.   21
line with results from the previous section, we find that increased trade does not expand growth 
in heavily regulated economies, and the effect is also always significant.  In contrast, the 
institutional measures are not significant, except for the ICRG index, which enters with the 
wrong sign.   
Some regions have grown faster than others in recent years, owing in part to geographical 
idiosyncrasies that may be unrelated to trade and institutions. We add regional dummy variables 
to our growth regressions both to align our work with common empirical approaches (controlling 
for regional effects on growth) and as a robustness check.  The coefficient on the interactive term 
is not significant when regional dummies are included—though its magnitude is very robust—
suggesting that the slower growth in some economies may be due in part to regional effects 
(column 3). 
To address endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables and feedback effects, we 
instrument for several of the variables in the regression. It is likely that income growth in the 
1990s spurred trade growth.  This would mean that both the coefficient on trade and the 
coefficient on the interactive term are likely to be too positive.  To control for this potential 
feedback effect, we instrument for growth in trade for the 1990s with growth in trade over the 
previous decade (the 1980s), initial trade at start of the decade, and the black market premium at 
the start of the decade (ln(1+black market premium)).  We instrument for the trade-regulation 
index dummy interactive term with the above-named instruments as well as the dummy for most 
regulated. We also instrument for the investment growth using lagged growth in investment.  
Columns 7-9 in Table 5 report results with trade, the trade interactive term, and 
investment instrumented.  The interactive term is less significant, though remains significant at 
the 10 percent level in all cases.  The coefficient on openness is not significant when we   22
instrument for investment and include regional dummies, however, the coefficient on the 
interactive term remains significant at the 10 percent level. 
Next, we repeat the exercise using growth in the ratio of trade to GDP at PPP.  The 
results are reported in Table 6.   When the interactive term is not included (column 1) trade 
growth is not significant.  However, when we include the interactive term (column 2), trade 
growth is positive and significant, while the interactive term is negative and significant.  The 
coefficient on the interactive term is larger in magnitude than the coefficient on openness, 
implying that there has been no benefit from expanded trade in highly regulated economies in the 
1990s.  The results are very robust.  We try including regional dummies (column 3), the 
institutional indices (column 4-6), and instrumenting for trade, the interactive term, and 
investment (columns 7-8) and the sign and significance of the coefficients remain similar.  In the 
final column, we instrument for trade, the interactive term, and investment, as well as include 
regional dummies.  In this case the significance of the coefficient on trade growth declines; the 
interactive term remains negative and highly significant.   
  The results from the growth regressions strongly support the levels regressions, 
confirming that greater openness is not conducive to income growth in highly regulated 
economies.  One advantage of the growth regressions is that the instruments do a better job of 
explaining trade growth and the interactive term, than they do in the levels regressions.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
Cross-country regressions suggest that increased trade is often good for growth.  We 
show that this relationship breaks down in the most heavily regulated economies.  Results from 
cross-sectional analysis imply that the effect of trade on growth in the long run is at best absent   23
and at worst negative in heavily regulated countries.  Results from decadal growth regressions 
confirm that trade does not stimulate growth in highly regulated economies. 
The paper provides one answer to the question of what complementary policies are 
necessary for trade to benefit an economy.  Our results imply that heavily regulated countries 
must improve their regulatory environment.  The good news is that some of the steps are 
relatively easy.  Governments can eliminate excess procedures for registering new businesses.  
The advent of new technologies, such as online registration, makes this an excellent time for 
countries to embark on this process.  However, as is always the case with deregulation, 
difficulties will arise because of interest groups that stand to lose from a more flexible 
environment.   
Our finding that trade might actually hamper growth in highly regulated countries 
warrants further research.  One possibility is that in these inflexible economies, trade tends to 
expand in the wrong goods as countries grow, leading to immiserizing growth.   The intuition 
follows directly from the theory of the second best.  With one distortion in place (excessive 
regulation), reducing a second distortion (such as trade barriers or transport costs) need not make 
the country better off.  If the regulatory environment severely distorts domestic prices then 
expanded trade can lead to lower income.  This would be the case, for example, in an economy 
where regulations raise the price of manufactured goods and tariffs raise the price of agricultural 
goods.  As tariffs come down and trade expands, production growth would primarily occur in the 
manufacturing sector, which could potentially lower welfare.  Provided the world relative price 
of manufactured products is sufficiently below the domestic price, the value of output would fall 
as the share of production devoted to them expands.  This is akin to Johnson’s (1967) example of   24
immiserizing growth, where growth in the face of a (tariff induced) price distortion leads to 
increased production of the good that the economy has a comparative disadvantage in producing.   
An alternative explanation is that an increase in trade effectively wipes out domestic 
industry in highly regulated countries.  Adjustment to a shock, such as increased openness, will 
take place very slowly in highly regulated economies.  In a dynamic setting, it is possible that as 
other economies grow and relative prices change, a highly regulated economy is always too 
late—experiencing a string of shocks to which it never fully adjusts.     25
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Figure 1: Cross-sectional (using current Trade/GDP) 
 









































Ln(Real GDP per capita)= 5.61 + 0.70 Ln(Trade/GDP)
T Statistic 2.40















































Figure 2: Cross-sectional (using Trade/GDP at PPP) 
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L n(Real GDP per capita) = 9.76 + 0.91  L n(Trade/GDP)
T Statistic 9.17









































Ln(Real GDP per capita) = 8.39 + 0.06 Ln(Trade/GDP)
T Statistic 0.40  29
Figure 3: Growth (using current Trade/GDP) 
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Growth in L n(Real GDP  per capita) = 0.01  + 0.02 Growth in L n(Trade/GDP)
   T Statistic  2.56





















































Growth in L n(Real GDP  per capita) = 0.01  + 0.004 Growth in L n(Trade/GDP)





Figure 4: Growth (using Trade/GDP at PPP) 
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Growth in ln(Real GDP per capita) = 0.01  +0.04 Growth in L n(Trade/GDP)
T statistic 3.47
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Growth in L n(Real GDP per capita) = 0.01  -0.002Growth in L n(Trade/GDP)
T statistic -0.21  30
 
Figure 5: Rule of Law and Regulation Index 
 






























Regulation Index = 3.91 -0.05 Rule of Law
T Statistic -6.75
   31
 Table 1: Cross-Sectional Estimation Results 
(Using Trade/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log real per 
capita GDP 2000 (PPP) 
One-quarter worst regulated 
 (1)
  (2)
  (3) (4)
  
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 




































































Region  dummies*  N N N Y 
R  -Squared  0.53 0.64 0.73 0.80 
#  of  Observations  108 108 108 108 
 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics calculated with Huber/White/Sandwich-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses.   
* Dummies for East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern and Central Europe, Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia, West Europe, North America (excluded), Sub Saharan Africa, and Latin America.    32
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Estimation Results  
(Using Trade/GDP at PPP) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log real per 
capita GDP 2000 (PPP) 
One-quarter worst regulated 
 (1)
  (2)
  (3) (4)
  
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 




































































Region  dummies*  N N N Y 
R  -Squared  0.57 0.68 0.74 0.83 
#  of  Observations  108 108 108 108 
 See notes under Table 1. 
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Table 3: Cross-Section Analysis, Instrumental Variables 
(Using Trade/GDP) 
 
One-quarter worst regulated  Dependent Variable: Log real 
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Shea partial R
2 of first-stage 
regressions 
        
   Ln (Trade/GDP)    --  0.02  0.06  0.11  0.10 
   Ln (Trade/GDP)*Regulation  
   Index Dummy Variable 
  0.12  0.04 0.10 0.25 0.23 
   Composite Regulation Index    --  0.27  0.29  0.38  0.24 
   Composite Regulation Index     
   Dummy Variable 
  --  0.04 0.10 --  -- 
   Rule of Law    --  --  --  --  0.18 
          
Hansen overidentification test     5.77  3.00  7.24  11.22  8.49 
   Χ
2(j)    P-Value    0.45  0.39 0.06 0.13 0.20 
          
R
2  0.64  0.19  0.03 0.37 0.44 0.60 
#  of  Observations  108  105  105 105 105 105 
 
*z-statistics in parentheses. 
(A)  Instrumented variables: Trade*Regulation Dummy.  Instruments: predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking 
European language, fraction of the population speaking English,  legal origin: British, French, Socialist, or German and 
included exogenous variables.  
(B)  Instrumented variables: Regulation Index, Regulation Dummy, Trade/GDP, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  Instruments: 
predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking European language, fraction of the population speaking English,  
legal origin: British, French, Socialist, or German and included exogenous variables. 
(C)  Two Stage Instrumented variables: Regulation Index, Regulation Dummy, Trade/GDP, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  
Instruments: predicted trade, dumfit, tradedumfit, fraction of the population speaking European language,  legal origin: 
British, French, or German, and excluded endogenous variables.  Where dumfit is the fitted value of the dummy for 
25% most regulated countries and  tradedumfit is the fitted value of the interaction term.  Dumfit and tradedumfit are 
estimated on the excluded exogenous variables using logit and tobit,  respectively. 
(D)  Instrumented variables: Rule of Law (when included), Ln(Trade/GDP), Regulation Index, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  
Instruments: predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking European languages, fraction of the population 
speaking English,  legal origin: British, French, or German, interactions between predicted trade and dummy, landlock 
and dummy, population and dummy, and between fraction of the population speaking European languages and dummy 
and excluded endogenous variables.   34
Table 4: Cross-Section Analysis, Instrumental Variables 
(Using Trade/GDP at PPP) 
 
One-quarter worst regulated  Dependent Variable: Log real 







  OLS  IV IV 2SIV  IV IV 






































































































        
Shea partial R
2 of first-stage 
regressions 
      
   Ln (Trade/GDP)    --  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.05 
   Ln (Trade/GDP)*Regulation  
   Index Dummy Variable 
  0.06 0.05 0.06 0.38 0.31 
   Composite Regulation Index    --  0.21  0.19  0.33  0.22 
   Composite Regulation Index     
   Dummy Variable 
  --  0.05 0.06 --  -- 
   Rule of Law    --  --  --  --  0.06 
        
Hansen  overidentification  test      5.39 3.20 2.77 6.80 8.71 
   Χ
2(j)    P-Value    0.37 0.20 0.43 0.34 0.12 
        
R
2  0.68 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.67 0.73 
#  of  Observations  108 105 105 105 105 105 
 
  *z-statistics in parentheses. 
(A)  Instrumented variables: Trade*Regulation Dummy.  Instruments: predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking 
English,  legal origin British, French, Socialist, or German and included exogenous variables.  
(B)  Instrumented variables: Regulation Index, Regulation Dummy, Trade/GDP, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  Instruments: 
predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking English,  legal origin British, French, Socialist, or German and 
included exogenous variables. 
(C)  Two Stage Instrumented variables: Regulation Index, Regulation Dummy, Trade/GDP, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  
Instruments: predicted trade, dumfit, tradedumfit, legal origin British, French, Socialist, or German, and excluded 
endogenous variables.  Where dumfit is the fitted value of the dummy for 25% most regulated countries and  
tradedumfit is the fitted value of the interaction term.  Dumfit and tradedumfit are estimated on the excluded exogenous 
variables using logit and tobit,  respectively. 
(D)  Instrumented variables: Rule of Law (when included), Ln(Trade/GDP), Regulation Index, Trade*Regulation Dummy.  
Instruments: predicted trade, fraction of the population speaking English,  legal origin: British, French, Socialist, or 
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Table 5: Growth Analysis 
(Using Trade/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable: Decadal average real per capita GDP growth (PPP) 
One-third worst regulated   
(1) (2)
  (3)
  (4)  (5)
  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 




Change over previous decade in  



















Change over previous decade in 
average Ln (Trade/GDP)  X 


















Initial log real per capita income at 
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Change over previous decade in 



















Change over previous decade in 
average institutional measure: 
             
Revolutions  -- -- --  0.001 
(0.18) 
-- -- --  -- -- 
Fraction of population killed in 
wars 
-- -- --  --  -0.58 
(-0.82) 
-- --  -- -- 
ICRG law and order  -- -- --  --  --  -0.004 
(-2.07) 



















Regional  dummies    N  N  Y  N N N N  N Y 
               
Shea partial R
2 of first-stage 
regressions 
             
   Ln (Trade/GDP)  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.12  0.13  0.12 
   Ln (Trade/GDP)*Regulation  
   Index Dummy Variable 
--  --  --  -- -- -- 0.25 0.24  0.13 
    Change over previous decade in   
    average investment/GDP at PPP    
--  --  --  -- -- -- --  0.38  0.36 
               
Hansen  overidentification  test   --  --  --  -- -- -- 4.14 4.06  2.78 
   Χ
2(j)    P-Value  --  --  --  -- -- -- 0.13 0.13  0.25 
               
R
2  0.38  0.41  0.48  0.41 0.42 0.42 0.33  0.30 0.26 
#  of  Observations  98  98  98  96 93 82 85  85 85 
 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics calculated with Huber/White/Sandwich-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.     
Regional dummies are as listed in Table 1. Asterisks denote variables instrumented. 
 
A: Sets of instruments are: lagged decadal change in ln (Trade/GDP), initial trade at start of the same decade, initial 
ln (1+black market premium rate) at start of same decade, lagged growth in investment (only when investment is 
instrumented) and regulation index dummy variable and exogenous variables in regression.   36
 
Table 6: Growth Analysis 
(Using Trade/GDP at PPP) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Decadal average real per capita GDP growth (PPP) 
One-third worst regulated   
(1) (2)
  (3)
  (4)  (5)
  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 




Change over previous decade in  



















Change over previous decade in 
average Ln (Trade/GDP)  X 


















Initial log real per capita income at 
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Change over previous decade in 
average institutional measure: 
             
Revolutions  -- -- --  -0.001 
(-0.24) 
-- -- --  -- -- 
Fraction of population killed in 
wars 
-- -- --  --  -1.04 
(-1.67) 
-- --  -- -- 
ICRG law and order  -- -- --  --  --  -0.002 
(-0.79) 



















Regional  dummies    N  N  Y  N N N N  N Y 
               
Shea partial R
2 of first-stage 
regressions 
             
   Ln (Trade/GDP)  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.41  0.41  0.30 
   Ln (Trade/GDP)*Regulation  
   Index Dummy Variable 
--  --  --  -- -- -- 0.49 0.49  0.31 
    Change over previous decade in   
    average investment/GDP at PPP    
--  --  --  -- -- -- --  0.42  0.43 
               
Hansen  overidentification  test   --  --  --  -- -- -- 3.53 3.42  0.07 
   Χ
2(j)    P-Value  --  --  --  -- -- -- 0.17 0.18  0.80 
               
R
2  0.28  0.35  0.46  0.35 0.37 0.36 0.30  0.29 0.46 
#  of  Observations  97  97  97  95 92 83 80  80 80 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: List of Countries in Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
Albania Dominican  Republic  Korea Republic.  Portugal 
Algeria  Ecuador  Kyrgyz Republic  Romania 
Argentina  Egypt Latvia  Russian  Federation 
Armenia  El Salvador  Lebanon Rwanda 
Australia Ethiopia Lesotho  Senegal 
Austria Finland  Lithuania  Slovak  Republic 
Azerbaijan  France Macedonia  Slovenia 
Bangladesh Georgia  Madagascar  South Africa 
Belarus  Germany Malawi  Spain 
Belgium Ghana  Malaysia Sri  Lanka 
Benin  Greece  Mali Sweden 
Bolivia Guatemala  Mexico  Switzerland 
Brazil Guinea  Moldova Syrian  Republic 
Bulgaria Honduras  Morocco Tanzania 
Burkina Faso  Hong Kong  Mozambique  Thailand 
Cameroon Hungary  Nepal  Togo 
Canada India  Netherlands  Tunisia 
Chad Indonesia  New Zealand  Turkey 
Chile Iran  Niger Uganda 
China Ireland  Nigeria  Ukraine 
Colombia  Israel Norway  United  Kingdom 
Congo Dem Rep.  Italy  Pakistan  United States of America 
Costa Rica  Jamaica Panama  Uruguay 
Cote D’Ivoire  Japan  Paraguay Venezuela 
Croatia Jordan  Peru  Yemen 
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan Philippines  Zambia 
Denmark Kenya  Poland  Zimbabwe 
Note: The one-quarter most heavily regulated countries are highlighted in italics. In order of degree of highest 
regulation the top fifteen in this sample are: Brazil, Belarus, Mozambique, Venezuela, Paraguay, Congo Dem, 
Portugal, Chad, El Salvador, Bolivia, Spain, Azerbaijan, Peru, Ukraine and Colombia. There are 108 countries in the 
sample.   38
 
 
Table A2: List of Countries in Growth Analysis 
 
Algeria Egypt  Lao  Portugal 
Angola El  Salvador  Lesotho Rwanda   
Argentina Ethiopía  Madagascar  Senegal 
Australia Finland  Malawi Slovak  Republic 
Austria France Malaysia  South  Africa 
Bangladesh Germany  Mali  Spain 
Belgium Ghana  Mauritania  Sri  Lanka 
Benin Greece  México  Sweden 
Bolivia Guatemala  Mongolia  Switzerland 
Brazil Guinea  Morocco  Syrian  Republic 
Bulgaria Haiti  Mozambique  Taiwan 
Burkina Faso  Honduras  Namibia  Thailand 
Botswana Hong  Kong  Nepal  Togo 
Cameroon Hungary  Netherlands Tunisia 
Canada India  New  Zealand  Turkey 
Chad Indonesia  Nicaragua  Uganda 
Chile Iran  Niger United  Kingdom 
China  Ireland  Nigeria  United States of America 
Colombia Israel  Norway  Uruguay 
Congo Republic.  Italy  Pakistan  Venezuela 
Costa Rica  Jamaica  Panama  Vietnam 
Cote D’Ivoire  Japan  Papua New Guinea  Zambia 
Denmark Jordan  Paraguay  Zimbabwe 
Dominican Republic  Kenya  Peru   
Ecuador Korea  Republic. Philippines   
There are 98 countries in the OLS sample using current trade as listed above. However in the sample for trade at 
PPP, Bulgaria, Germany, Hong Kong,  Lao and Mongolia are excluded but Macedonia, Poland, Romania and 
Tanzania are included.  39
 
Table A3: Tables of Correlation Coefficients 
(Cross-sectional Sample) 
 









Rule of Law  1       
Log (Trade/GDP)  0.24  1     
Log real per capita 
income (PPP constant 
1996$) 
0.77  0.22  1   
Composite Regulation 
Index 
-0.55  -0.19  -0.37  1 













Rule of Law  1       
Log (Trade/GDP at 
PPP) 
0.69  1     
Log real per capita 
income (PPP constant 
1996$) 
0.77  0.54  1   
Composite Regulation 
Index 
-0.55  -0.39  -0.37  1 
No of Observations  108       
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of the Regulation Index by Income Group and Region  
     (in natural logarithms) 
 
Income Group  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
Low Income  3.93  0.06  35 
Lower Middle  3.94  0.07  32 
Upper Middle  3.92  0.07  16 
High 3.84  0.09  25 
Overall  3.91  0.08  108 
Region       
East Asia & Pacific  3.85  0.10  10 
Europe and Central Asia  3.93  0.05  22 
Middle East and North Africa  3.92  0.06  12 
South Asia  3.88  0.04  5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.92  0.06  25 
Latin American & Caribbean  3.97  0.07  18 
Western Europe  3.84  0.08  14 
North America  3.72  0.02  2 
Note: Income group classification is according to World Bank Classification. Higher values on the regulatory index 
amount to more regulation. The entire Doing Business sample as at January 2004 consists of 133 countries. The 
series for number of entry procedures, number of days and employment laws index over these 133 countries were 
rescaled so that the mean of each series equaled 50 and the standard deviation 5.  The regulation index = 
0.5*ln(entry index) + 0.5*ln(labor employment laws index) where ln(entry index) = ln(0.5*number of entry 
procedures+0.5*number of days). The labor employment laws index is itself an equal weighted average of the 
flexibility of hiring index, conditions of employment index and flexibility of firing index. The regulation index 
ranges in value from 3.71 to 4.09. 
 
 